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JURISDICTIONAL LINE-DRAWING IN A TIME
WHEN SO MUCH LITIGATION IS "RELATED
TO" BANKRUPTCY: A PRACTICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION
Duane Loft*
[T]he whole purpose of [bankruptcy law]-conservation and
equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate in carrying out the
constitutional power over bankruptcy-require[s] the availability of
federal jurisdiction to avoid expense and delay.'
INTRODUCTION
The past five years have seen some of the largest corporate
bankruptcies in history-WorldCom,2 Enron,3 Federal-Mogul,4 just to
name a few.5 Collapsing into bankruptcy amid allegations of fraud or
mass tort, these companies precipitated waves of litigation in state
courts across America.6 Bankruptcy served as protection against
thousands of angry state court plaintiffs, staying their litigation 7 and
forcing them to line up with other creditors to receive cents on the
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law.
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1. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 484 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533, 2002 WL 1732647, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
July 22, 2002).
3. In re Enron Corp., 274 B.R. 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
4. In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 282 B.R. 301 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
5. For a complete list of the largest corporate bankruptcies since 1980, see The
Largest
Bankruptcies
1980-Present,
BankruptcyData.com,
at
http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/15-Largest.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
6. See In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 2002)
(deciding whether to transfer "tens of thousands of asbestos-related tort claims" to
federal court or to remand them "to the state courts where they were originally
filed"); In re Enron Corp., 296 B.R. 505, 507 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (involving "two
of the more than 100 actions that have been filed across the country following the
collapse of the Enron Corporation"); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308,
312-13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing how multiple securities actions, first filed
in state courts, were consolidated and centralized in the Southern District of New
York).
7. See infra note 14 and accompanying text for an explanation of bankruptcy's
automatic stay.
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dollar for their damages. 8 Yet, when a bankruptcy court stayed suits
against the debtor, plaintiffs often turned to affiliated non-debtor
third parties to exact more complete monetary rewards.'
In the
securities fraud context, illustrated by trials surrounding the Enron
and WorldCom bankruptcies, plaintiffs sued the debtor's accountants
and directors when unable to proceed directly against the debtor. ° In
cases representing the mass tort scenario, such as those produced by
the Federal-Mogul and Dow Corning bankruptcies, tort victims sued
third-party distributors of a debtor's injurious products when the
debtor itself became bankrupt.1 1 This Note addresses the question of
when such bankruptcy-related litigation belongs in federal court. The
Note concludes that federal jurisdiction is appropriate only where the
third-party defendant has filed a proof of claim, a procedural measure
necessary to ensure the defendant's right to distribution from the
estate.1 2
As an example of the procedural timeline for these types of cases,
consider the following hypothetical from the mass tort context. A
third-party plaintiff sues Corporation X in state court, claiming injury
by some product the corporation manufactured-for example, a brake
pad containing asbestos. The plaintiff also names as co-defendants
various distributors of the brake pad, alleging they too are liable on
the same tort claims as Corporation X. Then, subsequent to the filing
of the plaintiff's lawsuit, Corporation X files a petition for
reorganization under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.13 As a result of the filing, all tort claims against the corporation,
now a debtor in bankruptcy are stayed automatically pursuant to §
362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.14 The plaintiff is left suing only the
non-debtor distributors in state court. These distributors then seek
removal to federal court on the grounds that their state court lawsuit
is "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy. 15 They argue that the
outcome of the lawsuit will give rise to rights of contribution and

8. See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul,300 F.3d at 373 (noting that the "filing of the
Debtors' chapter 11 petitions stayed the state court proceedings as to them").
9. Id.
10. See In re WorldCom, 293 B.R. at 313.
11. See In re Federal-Mogul,300 F.3d at 373; In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d
482, 485 (6th Cir. 1996).
12. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
14. Id. § 362(a). Section 362 provides for an automatic injunction, triggered by
the filing of a bankruptcy petition, which broadly stays any litigation, lien
enforcement, or other actions to collect on a pre-petition claim. See id. In this
example, the automatic stay clearly would extend to the tort lawsuits as they arise prepetition and are attempts to collect on a claim.
15. Authority to remove is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (2000). See, e.g., In
re Federal-Mogul,300 F.3d at 373.
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indemnity against the debtor, rights which will in turn affect the
debtor's estate and alter distribution among creditors. 6
The question grappled with by courts,17 and the focus of this Note, is
exactly when such "related to" jurisdiction should provide a federal
forum for suits such as these, both constitutionally and as a policy
matter. Title 28, § 1334 confers federal subject matter jurisdiction
over proceedings "related to" a bankruptcy case. is Accordingly, even
in the absence of diversity,19 a federal court can adjudicate state-law
litigation because of its relation to a federal bankruptcy case. The
statute, however, fails to define the phrase "related to," and the
legislative history merely suggests that Congress'2° intended the
jurisdictional grant to be broad and "comprehensive.
Expansive "related to" jurisdiction exists to serve the goals of speed
and efficiency so integral to the bankruptcy system. Yet, beyond
certain points, "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction threatens to
exceed Article III's grant of federal judicial power.2 '
For example, in the above hypothetical, the potential effect of the
distributors' future indemnity claims may or may not provide
adequate relatedness. This question will turn on difficult assessments
of the merit of plaintiff's claim and the likelihood of a future
indemnity claim by the distributors. Even more difficult is the
situation where the distributors need a second lawsuit to conclude
their rights to indemnification. Perhaps a federal court has no place
answering these questions-i.e., speculating on the merits of state law
claims-when analyzing the jurisdictional "related to" issue.
This Note argues that courts, in conducting the "related to"
analysis, should look to whether the third-party defendant has filed a
proof of claim against the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 501 of the
Bankruptcy Code.22 The existence of a proof of claim ensures that the
related action constitutes a justiciable supplement to a federal
question "Case. '23
Further, the proof of claim requirement4
guarantees that exercises of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction
16. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000).
19. Id. § 1332.
20. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 47 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6009
[hereinafter House Report].
21. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution.... ").
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). A proof of claim is a procedural device to ensure
that creditors receive proportionate distribution from the bankruptcy estate. See infra
notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
23. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending federal judicial power to "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under ... the Laws of the United States").
24. Throughout this Note, "bankruptcy jurisdiction" refers to the statutory grant
of federal subject matter jurisdiction extending to bankruptcy cases and all their
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neither under-serve nor over-serve the policy goals of a quick and
efficient bankruptcy regime.
Part I of this Note begins by outlining bankruptcy jurisdiction's
current statutory scheme.
Part I.B. continues with a general
discussion of its historical development, focusing in particular on prior
statutory grants of jurisdiction over what would now be "related to"
matters. Part I.C. then summarizes the breadth of case law in the
"related to" area, separating out patterns of approaches and
standards.
Part II sets forth various ways commentators have explained the
constitutionality of expansive "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. It
concludes that analogies to supplemental jurisdiction, in both its
common-law and codified forms, best justify the power to bring state
law disputes into federal court based only on their relation to a
bankruptcy.
Part II.B. suggests that, because analogies to
supplemental jurisdiction offer the best, albeit problematic,
explanations, principles of supplemental jurisdiction should define the
proper scope of "related to" jurisdiction.
Part III.A. presents the problems that arise with a protective theory
of bankruptcy jurisdiction. Part III.B. concludes that analogies to
supplemental jurisdiction best explain the constitutionality of § 1334's
"related to" provision. Parts III.C. and III.D. offer the proof of claim
device as a way to make the supplemental jurisdiction analogy,
discussed earlier, work properly. This part argues further that the
existence of a proof of claim serves as the best mechanism for testing
the proper relatedness of third-party litigation. Finally, Part III.E.
asserts that a proof of claim requirement accommodates policies in
tension, balancing efficiency on one side with fairness to litigants on
the other.
I. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF "RELATED TO" BANKRUPTCY
JURISDICTION: CODE AND CASE LAW

This part offers a comprehensive look at how "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction became what it is today. Part I.A. begins by
setting forth the current statutory scheme. Part I.B. then goes back
two hundred years to discuss the historical antecedents of the "related
to" provision. Part I.C. finishes by describing the ways courts have
synthesized this legislative history and arrived at varying
interpretations of the general, open-ended "related to" language.

attendant litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000).
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A. The Current Statutory Structure of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Section 1334 currently establishes federal subject matter jurisdiction
over three types of bankruptcy proceedings: (1) those "arising under"
the Bankruptcy Code; (2) those "arising in" a bankruptcy case; and
(3) those "related to" a bankruptcy case.25 The first class of
proceedings, those "arising under" the Bankruptcy Code, are causes
of action that the Bankruptcy Code explicitly authorizes, or that
invoke a right created by a provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 26 The
arising under clause of § 1334 is similar to the general arising under
grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Methods used to test for general § 1331
jurisdiction similarly apply in the bankruptcy context. 27 Examples of
"arising under" cases might include a suit to recover a fraudulent
transfer,2 s an action to avoid a preference,2 9 or a suit to recover a
postpetition transfer.3 a
The "arising in" grant covers suits that only exist due to the filing of
a bankruptcy case, and that do not, like "arising under" cases, derive
from rights created by title 11.31 These types of proceedings are
usually administrative matters such as hearings to determine the
allowance of a claim, to appoint a trustee, or to resolve the
dischargeability of a debt. 2
The "related to" grant of subsection 1334(b) provides for federal
subject matter jurisdiction over disputes that neither "arise in"nor
"arise under" title 11, but which nevertheless bear some relation to
25. Id. § 1334(b) ("[T]he district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to
cases under title 11."). Subsection 1334(a) establishes federal jurisdiction over the
bankruptcy "case," which differs from the civil proceedings to which subsection
1334(b) refers. A bankruptcy "case" begins with the filing of a petition for relief, and
encompasses all of the proceedings that occur during the course of the bankruptcy
case until it is closed.
26. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy 3.01[4][c][i], at 3-21 to 3-22 (Lawrence P. King
ed., 15th ed. rev. 2003) [hereinafter Collier].
27. The Supreme Court has wavered on the proper test for 1331 arising under
jurisdiction. The classic formulation is that a suit arises under the law that creates the
cause of action. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916). Since American Well Works, other tests have gained favor. See, e.g., Merrell
Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986) (applying a balancing
standard that weighs the state and federal interests in assuming jurisdiction, with a
particular emphasis on congressional intent to provide for a federal cause of action).
See generally 15 James Win. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice, § 103.31[1], at
103-33 (3d ed. 1997) ("If state law creates the cause of action, the second test asks
whether that cause of action poses a substantial federal question.")
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).
29. Id. § 547.
30. Id. § 549. For more examples, see Collier, supra note 26, 3.01[4][c][i], at 322.
31. See Collier, supra note 26, 3.01[4][c][i], at 3-30.
32. Id. at 3-29 to 3-30.
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the bankruptcy case.33
Litigants generally seek "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction in one of two possible situations. The first
involves a debtor suing on a state-law cause of action that accrued
before filing for bankruptcy.34
These suits neither invoke a
substantive right provided by title 11, nor constitute a proceeding
which could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case. Despite
preceding the filing of a petition, however, the suits become property
of the estate pursuant to § 541. 35 Because any proceeds of a judgment
in the debtor's favor will become property subject to distribution
among creditors, the proceeding is deemed sufficiently "related to"
the bankruptcy to sustain federal jurisdiction.36
The second situation, and the focus of this Note, involves litigation
between so called third-parties-parties who are neither a trustee nor
a debtor in bankruptcy.37 In this type of situation, one of the thirdparties-either the plaintiff or the defendant-seeks "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction as a way into federal court absent diversity or
a § 1331 federal question.3" According to most courts, this third-party
litigant must establish as a threshold matter that the outcome of his
proceeding "could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administered in bankruptcy. '39 This "conceivable effect" standard is
no bright-line rule, and there exists a breadth of case law giving the
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
34. See Collier,supra note 26, 3.0114][c][ii], at 3-24.
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000) (defining property of the debtor's estate to
include "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property"); see, e.g., N.
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (related action by
debtor for breach of contract); In re Midgard Corp., 204 B.R. 764, 777 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 1997) (related action by debtor for tortious interference); see generally Collier,
supra note 26, 3.01[4][c][ii][A], at 3-24.
36. See, e.g., In re Midgard, 204 B.R. at 772.
37. See Collier, supra note 26,
3.01[4][c][ii][B], at 3-25 to 3-29. In chapter 7
cases, the bankruptcy court usually appoints a Trustee in Bankruptcy who oversees
administration of the estate. Id.
1.03[2][c][ii], at 1-26. In chapter 11 cases, the
debtor in possession takes over management of the debtor-company throughout the
reorganization process. Id. 1.03[4][a], at 1-38 to 1-39.
38. These are generally the most difficult cases, and those that most effectively
test the limits of "related to" jurisdiction. See Collier, supra note 26, 3.01[4][c][ii][B],
at 3-26. The "related to" question arises when either the third-party plaintiff seeks
original federal jurisdiction under § 1334, see supra note 25, or the third-party
defendant seeks removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (2000). The first type of
cases, discussed supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text, satisfy the "related to"
standard relatively easily. If the state suit that became property of the estate ends in
the debtor's favor, the estate immediately benefits, either financially or otherwise. In
the third-party class of cases, however, the conclusion of the related proceeding may
or may not immediately affect the debtor. This will depend on whether the losing
third-party decides to pursue its newly acquired rights against the debtor. Only then
will the third-party litigation affect the bankruptcy.
39. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
Some courts have adopted variations on this threshold standard, and a minority of
circuit courts applies alternate tests. See infra Part I.C.
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The classic third-party

scenario is tort litigation against non-debtor defendants who have
potential rights to contribution or indemnity against a debtor in
bankruptcy.4 1

These cases pose difficult questions of exactly how

much effect the third-party litigation will have on the bankruptcy, and
whether that effect forms a constitutionally sufficient connection to
the bankruptcy.4"
Section 1334(c)'s

mandatory

and

discretionary

abstention

provisions act to temper the statute's broad jurisdictional reach.43
Subsection 1334(c)(2) requires a court to abstain from a "related to"
proceeding based on state law causes of action if the proceeding could

not have been commenced in federal court absent bankruptcy
jurisdiction, and if the proceedings can be commenced and timely
adjudicated in state court.44 Subsection 1334(c)(1) provides that, as a

matter of discretion, a court may, "in the interest of comity with State
courts or respect
for State law," abstain from hearing a related
4
proceeding.
B. The HistoricalDevelopment of "Related to" Jurisdiction
The current jurisdictional scheme under § 1334 is the end product of
more than two hundred years of congressional, judicial, and popular
debate over the proper scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction. This section
lays out its legislative history in broad strokes, focusing in particular
on the evolution of bankruptcy jurisdiction over third-party litigation.

40. See infra Part I.C.
41. For examples, see infra note 87.
42. See infra Parts I.C., II.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (2000).
44. Id. § 1334(c)(2).
45. Id. § 1334(c)(1). In determining whether to abstain voluntarily from hearing a
proceeding, courts consider, among others, the following factors:
(1) [T]he effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the estate if a
Court recommends abstention, (2) the extent to which state law issues
predominate over bankruptcy issues, (3) the difficulty or unsettled nature of the
applicable law, (4) the presence of a related proceeding commenced in state court
or other nonbankruptcy court, (5) the jurisdictional basis, if any, other than 28
U.S.C. § 1334, (6) the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to
the main bankruptcy case, (7) the substance rather than form of an asserted
"core" proceeding, (8) the feasibility of severing state law claims from core
bankruptcy matters to allow judgments to be entered in state court with
enforcement left to the bankruptcy court, (9) the burden of [the bankruptcy
court's] docket, (10) the likelihood that the commencement of the proceeding in
bankruptcy court involves forum shopping by one of the parties, (11) the existence
of a right to a jury trial, and (12) the presence in the proceeding of nondebtor
parties.
In re Tucson Estates, Inc., 912 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing In re Republic
Reader's Serv., Inc., 81 B.R. 422, 429 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987)).
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1. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800
The first piece of bankruptcy legislation in the United States, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, contained no jurisdictional provisions.4 6
Courts treated the Bankruptcy Act like any other federal law for
purposes of subject matter jurisdiction.4 7 Accordingly, federal courts
had traditional federal question jurisdiction over matters arising under
the bankruptcy laws of the United States.48
2. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841
With the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 came the first explicit grant of
federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters.49 Justice Story, in Ex
parte Christy," broadly interpreted this jurisdictional provision as
reaching to "all cases where the rights, claims, and property of the
bankrupt, or those of his assignee, are concerned."5 1 According to
Justice Story, bankruptcy jurisdiction did not stop at suits involving
Rather, the
property held by the court as part of the estate.
jurisdictional reach of the Act extended to disputes over property
outside the court's possession, when the debtor sought to recover such
property from an adverse claimant.5 3
3. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 codified Justice Story's broad
conception of bankruptcy jurisdiction and adopted language very
similar to that of the 1841 Act.54 The jurisdictional provisions of the
1867 Act received similarly broad treatment by the Supreme Court.55
Under the 1867 Act, a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction was both in rem
and in personam.56 As such, the court could hear in rem actions
46. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (amended 1801 & 1802)
(repealed 1803).
47. See Lucas v. Morris, 15 F. Cas. 1063 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1825) (No. 8,587).
48. The source of this jurisdiction was Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S.
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000)).
49. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 440, 445 (repealed 1843) (conferring
bankruptcy jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings, including "all acts, matters,
and things to be done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy").
50. 44 U.S. 292 (1845).
51. Id. at 313.
52. Id. at 313-14.
53. Id.
54. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 1, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878)
("[Bankruptcy courts] shall have original jurisdiction.., in all matters and
")
proceedings in bankruptcy ....
55. See Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 517 (1875) (interpreting the jurisdictional
language of the 1867 Act as "very broad and general").
56. In personam jurisdiction, necessary to render a personal money judgment or
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regarding disputed claims to property of the estate, in addition to in
personam actions brought by the trustee to collect "assets of the
bankrupt" not yet part of the estate.5 7
Federal bankruptcy jurisdiction extended to in personam actions in
order to ensure fast, fair, and efficient administration of the estate. 8
This extension, however, also "produced a persistent tension between
the federal interest in estate administration and the localized interests
of particular litigants, witnesses,
and attorneys, who often found the
59
federal forum inconvenient.,
4. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898

With these concerns in mind, Congress substantially retracted the
reach of bankruptcy jurisdiction with the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.60 The 1898 Act provided for novel treatment
of the in personam actions which the 1867 Act previously empowered
federal courts to hear. The 1898 Act termed such in personam actions
"controversies at law and in equity, '61 or "plenary suits, '62 and
injunction against a defendant, depends on the defendant's physical presence in or
connection to the state where the lawsuit is brought. See generally 16 Moore's Federal
Practice, supra note 27, § 108.02[1-2], at 108-15. In rem jurisdiction, on the other
hand, allows a state, by virtue of its power over any property within its borders, to
render a judgment determining the interests of persons in such property. Id. Unlike a
judgment in personam, an in rem judgment does not impose any personal obligation
on the defendant. Id.
57. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, §§ 1-2, 14 Stat. 517, 518 (repealed 1878); see
generally Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 533 (1900) (describing how section
2 of the Act of 1867 conferred federal jurisdiction over "suits... between assignees in
bankruptcy and adverse claimants of property of the bankrupt").
58. See Lathrop, 91 U.S. at 518; Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 346-47 (1874).
59. Ralph Brubaker, One Hundred Years of Federal Bankruptcy Law and Still
Clinging to an In rem Model of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction,15 Bankr. Dev. J. 261, 266
(1999); see also Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 649 n.15 (1947) (describing the
concerns of litigant inconvenience and expense that motivated the jurisdictional
provisions of the Act of 1898).
60. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 545 (repealed 1978). Section
2 of the 1898 Act mostly repeated the broad grant of jurisdiction contained in section
1 of the 1867 Act, but added the words "except as herein otherwise provided." Id. at
546. This exception referenced section 23, which excluded from bankruptcy
jurisdiction most in personam actions brought by the trustee. Id. § 23, at 552.
61. Id.
62. Under the 1867 and 1841 Acts, a suit "at law or in equity" required an
independent "plenary" suit in circuit court launched by a formal complaint. See Ex
parte Christy, 44 U.S. 292, 314-15, 316-17 (1845) (applying the 1841 Act). As this was
the practice currently in place, the 1867 Act used the phrase "at law or in equity"
likewise to indicate a plenary suit. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544,
552. Plenary suits were procedurally different from summary proceedings. See
generally Brubaker, supra note 59, at 267 n.26 ("'Summary' jurisdiction accurately
connoted the more informal procedures used in summary matters, whereas a plenary
suit was an ordinary civil action conducted according to the normal rules of civil
procedure.").
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directed them to state courts, leaving federal courts primarily with in
rem jurisdiction over "summary "63 proceedings concerning estate
property in possession of the court. 6'
The summary/plenary bifurcation revived an exclusively in rem
model of bankruptcy jurisdiction that originated in England. 65 The
Act of 1898 limited summary jurisdiction, and hence federal
bankruptcy jurisdiction, to disputes over property in the actual or
constructive possession of the court.66 Without possession of a
jurisdictional res, federal courts lacked power to hear a trustee's suit
against an adverse claimant. 67 Hints of the in personam jurisdictional
model still lingered, however. According to the Supreme Court in
Williams v. Austrian,68 if a trustee were administering a Chapter X
business reorganization, he could bring a plenary suit in federal
court. 69 Although confined to the business reorganization context,
this interpretation of the Act revealed elements of a broader in
personam rationale for federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.7"
Apart from creating the summary/plenary divide, the Act of 1898
provided for a limited grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction over thirdparty disputes-disputes that today would fall under the "related to"

63. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 545.
64. See generally Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 537-38 (1900) (giving
full effect to the language of section 23, and holding that suits to record fraudulent
transfers, like other plenary suits, were to be tried in state courts). Summary
jurisdiction, which the Act did not define, included the traditional administrative
procedures of the bankruptcy process. See generally Daniel R. Cowans, Bankruptcy
Law and Practice § 576, at 217 (2d ed. 1978). Examples of summary jurisdiction
include, among others, the discharging of debts, the appointing of trustees, and the
determining of how to liquidate assets. Id. at 217-18. For a more extensive list, see the
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 545-46, which included nineteen
categories of proceedings over which the bankruptcy courts had summary jurisdiction.
Both bankruptcy courts and federal district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over
these summary matters. Id. In 1903, Congress amended the Act of 1898 to provide
for some specific instances where federal courts could hear a trustee's plenary actions.
See Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 8, 32 Stat. 797, 798-99. One was when a defendant
consented to jurisdiction. Id. The others were suits to avoid liens and suits to recover
preferences or fraudulent conveyances. Id.
65. See Brubaker, supra note 59, at 263.
66. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 546. Yet federal courts could
hear, as summary matters, suits by the trustee against a third-party where that thirdparty, usually a creditor, had asserted a claim of its own and had thus "consented" to
jurisdiction. Id. § 23; see also Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Law
of Debtors and Creditors 934 (4th ed. 2001) (noting how "[t]his 'consent' approach
became so extended and artificial as to be called 'jurisdiction by ambush').
67. See Brubaker, supra note 59, at 267.
68. 331 U.S. 642 (1947).
69. See id. at 646-47.
70. Id. at 657-58 ("Congress intended by the elimination of § 23 to establish the
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear plenary suits brought by a reorganization trustee,
even though diversity or other usual ground for federal jurisdiction is lacking.")
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provision of § 1334.71 Courts interpreting the jurisdictional provisions
of the 1898 Act generally held that a federal court, absent diversity or
federal question, may only decide third-party disputes if administering

the bankruptcy would be impossible without such determination.7 2

Thus, the space for bankruptcy-related matters in federal courts
remained limited under the 1898 Act, far more so than it is today.
5. Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

By 1978, federal courts had become considerably more accessible
than they were in 1898. 73 As the concerns of litigant inconvenience
diminished, considerations of delay and judicial efficiency took their
place, compelling Congress to expand the jurisdictional grant for
bankruptcy-related matters, and eliminate the bifurcated structure of
the 1898 Act.74

Congress

saw

two

primary

benefits

to

eliminating

the

summary/plenary jurisdictional regime. First was a reduction in the

unnecessary delay inherent in a system where the constituent
bankruptcy proceedings scatter among numerous state and federal
fora.
The bifurcated structure created lengthy, piecemeal
adjudication whenever a bankruptcy court could not hear a plenary
matter and had to wait out its resolution in a non-bankruptcy forum.75
Second, Congress sought to reduce the expense of protracted
litigation over questions involving whether a particular proceeding
was fit for summary or plenary adjudication.7 6 This expense depleted
the estate and damaged the prospects
for a reorganizing business to
77
emerge from bankruptcy successfully.
71. Section 2, categories 6 and 7 of the 1898 Act, taken together, conferred federal
jurisdiction over third-party disputes that were "necessary for the complete
determination of a [bankruptcy] matter in controversy." Act of July 1, 1898, § 2; see
generally Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A
GeneralStatutory and ConstitutionalTheory, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 743, 781 (2000).
72. See, e.g., First State Bank & Trust Co. of Guthrie, Okla. v. Sand Springs State
Bank of Sand Springs, Okla., 528 F.2d 350, 353 (10th Cir. 1976); In re Burton Coal
Co., 126 F.2d 447, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1942).
73. House Report, supra note 20, at 48.
74. See David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical Analysis of
Insolvency Laws and Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdictionof Today's
United States Bankruptcy Court and its Judicial Officers, 9 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 165,
188 (2000).
75. See Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, at 101 (1973) [hereinafter Commission Report].
76. See id.; see also House Report, supra note 20, at 43.
77. See Commission Report, supra note 75, at 101. The goals outlined in the
congressional reports addressed the problems with plenary disputes that involve the
trustee or debtor in possession as a party to the lawsuit. For third-party disputes, the
policy considerations arguably differ. Delay in a suit on behalf of the estate causes
legal fees to mount that needlessly deplete the estate property, limiting the chances of
a successful reorganization or liquidation. The cost to litigate third-party disputes, on

1102

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

To address these difficulties of delay and expense, the House and
Senate separately offered two bills, each differing in its approach to
jurisdiction. The House intended that bankruptcy jurisdiction under
the new Code first incorporate all matters provided for in section 2a
of the 1898 Act.78 The House bill then provided for bankruptcy
jurisdiction over: (1) administrative matters "arising in connection
with petitions"; (2) "disputes affecting property in the custody of the
court"; (3) administrative controversies "in which the adverse parties
consent or waive objections to the court's jurisdiction"; and (4)
proceedings based on a cause of action created by the Code.7 9
Moreover, the House bill granted federal in personam jurisdiction
over matters "related to cases under Title 11. 80 The House report
was silent, however, on the substantive relatedness required under this
provision.
The Senate, on the other hand, initially adopted an "estate-asparty" jurisdictional approach through a grant of jurisdiction over "all
civil proceedings by or against a debtor in possession, a trustee, or
other representative of the estate of a debtor."81 The Senate later
amended this provision, and the committee report described the
change in jurisdictional scope as "expanded to include all
controversies arising out of"-the Senate's original estate-as-a-party
grant-"or related to a [bankruptcy] case. 8' 2 Such an "expansion,"
shows that the Senate imagined federal jurisdiction over disputes
between third parties with which a representative of the estate was not
involved.8 3
The resulting legislation enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1471, which contained
jurisdictional language virtually identical to that of the current §
1334.'I The Act provided for federal jurisdiction over proceedings
the other hand, does not directly fall on the estate, as third parties pay attorney fees
out of pocket. Delay in third-party litigation might, however, impose costs indirectly
to the estate by prolonging its administration. Thus, eliminating delay and expense is
a valid policy consideration for third-party actions as well-actions that needlessly
slow down a bankruptcy administration.
78. See House Report, supra note 20, at 46.
79. Id. at 43-44. Some representatives proposed that detriment to the estate be
shown prior to removal to federal court. Id. at 51; see also Brubaker, supra note 71, at
797. The House defeated this proposal, finding it "inadequate to alleviate the
problems that exist under the current jurisdictional framework," and likely to cause
new problems of its own. House Report, supra note 20, at 51.
80. House Report, supra note 20, at 49. The Report also noted that the House bill
would grant "the bankruptcy courts broad and complete jurisdiction over all matters
and proceedings that arise in connection with bankruptcy cases." Id. at 48.
81. See Brubaker, supra note 71, at 796 n.191 (citation omitted).
82. See S. Rep. 95-989, at 153 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5939
[hereinafter Senate Report].
83. See Brubaker, supra note 71, at 796 n.191.
84. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat.
2549, 2668-69 (enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (repealed 1984)); see generally Kennedy &
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arising under title 11, and disputes arising in or related to a
bankruptcy case.
C. Articulatinga Standardfor "Related to" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:
Pacor and Its Progeny
The above history of bankruptcy jurisdiction in the United States
reveals a steady widening of the space available in federal courts for
bankruptcy-related matters. However, the plain language of the
current "related to" grant offers no real guidelines for defining its
precise scope.85 The federal circuit courts disagree on exactly how
broadly to read the "related to" language, and how to articulate a
common law standard to enforce the appropriate reading.86 The case
law has merely assembled an ad hoc patchwork to solve this difficult
jurisdictional question. Many circuit courts, purportedly relying on
identical tests, have reached divergent results in instances of almost
identical factual and procedural circumstances. 87
Clift, supra note 74, at 188. Section 1471, however, granted this pervasive and original
jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts, presided over by non-Article III judges. In 1984,
the Supreme Court held that non-Article III bankruptcy judges could not
constitutionally decide bankruptcy-related proceedings that were far removed from
the "core" of traditional bankruptcy powers. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71, 87 (1982). In response, Congress modified the
jurisdictional grant set forth in the 1978 Act by creating two distinct categories of
bankruptcy proceedings: (1) "core" proceedings over which the bankruptcy courts
had full jurisdiction; and (2) "non-core" proceedings, over which the bankruptcy
courts had only limited power. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). Under the current, postNorthern Pipeline regime, federal district courts can refer non-core, related matters to
the bankruptcy courts, who in turn can only submit findings and conclusions of law
subject to review by the district courts. See generally, Kennedy & Clift, supra note 74,
at 191-96.
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
86. The majority of circuit courts have at least nominally adopted the Pacor test
for "related to" jurisdiction. See In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (1st Cir.
1991); In re Gardner, 913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.,
910 F.2d 784, 788 & n.19 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Fietz, 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1988);
In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Dogpatch, U.S.A., Inc., 810 F.2d 782,
786 (8th Cir. 1987); A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1002 n.ll (4th Cir.
1986). The Second and Seventh Circuits appear to have adopted slightly different
tests. Compare In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th Cir. 1987) (focusing the
inquiry on the effect of third-party litigation on estate property or allocation of that
property among creditors), with In re Turner, 724 F.2d 338, 341 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding
bankruptcy jurisdiction where third-party litigation bears a "significant connection" to
the bankruptcy).
87. For example, in In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 372 (3d Cir.
2002), the Third Circuit heard an appeal from distributors of Federal-Mogul's
asbestos-ridden brake pads. The distributors were defending mass tort claims and
were seeking "related to" removal due to their potential indemnification and
contribution rights against Federal-Mogul, then a debtor in chapter 11. Id. at 372-73.
The lower court had denied removal, and the Third Circuit refused to issue a writ of
mandamus to overturn the denial. The Third Circuit reasoned that, because a ruling
against the distributor defendants will not bind Federal-Mogul, the dispute is not
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1. The Dominant Standard for "Related to" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
The starting point for any "related to" analysis is a determination of
whether the outcome of the third-party dispute "could conceivably
have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy." 88
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit initiated this
"conceivable effect" test in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins.89 It is slightly
misleading, however, to label any "conceivable effect" formulation
"the Pacortest." To do so, as the case itself illustrates, would extend
Pacormore broadly than its holding dictates.
Pacor involved a suit in Pennsylvania state court brought by John
Higgins and his wife against Pacor, Inc., a distributor of chemical
supplies.9" The plaintiffs sought damages for work-related exposure to
asbestos supplied by Pacor. 1 After being named in the complaint,
Pacor filed a third-party impleader claim against the Johns-Manville
Corporation, the original manufacturer of the asbestos.9 2 JohnsManville then filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. District Court for the

Southern District of New York.93

The Pennsylvania state court

proceeded to sever Pacor's impleader claim against Johns-Manville

from the Higgins's tort action. 94 In response, Pacor filed two motions:
(1) a motion to remove both actions to the Pennsylvania bankruptcy
court; and (2) a motion to transfer the action to the Southern District
of New York, where the case could join with the Johns-Manville

"related to" the bankruptcy for purposes of § 1334(b). Id. at 376. Contrast that ruling
with In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996). There, the Sixth Circuit
faced the issue of whether mass tort claims against suppliers of silicon breast implants
were sufficiently related to the Dow Corning Corporation's bankruptcy to sustain
federal jurisdiction. Id. at 485. The Sixth Circuit found that the claims were indeed so
related. Id. at 495.
88. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted)
(emphasis omitted). Pacor has been almost universally recognized as the touchstone
for "related to" questions. See, e.g., In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d 1171,
1181 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1996).
Even for those circuits that have not formally adopted Pacor, [it] has provided an
indispensable and frequently cited frame of reference, a veritable beacon on the
uncharted and perilous waters of bankruptcy subject matter jurisdiction. The
references to Pacorin Shepard's Citations are legion. When federal courts must
consider whether an issue is a related proceeding, the starting point has
universally been Pacor.
Id.
89. See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994 (formulating the test as "whether the outcome of
that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in
bankruptcy") (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
90. Id. at 986.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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bankruptcy." The Pennsylvania bankruptcy court denied removal on
the ground that it was untimely.96 On appeal, the district court
disagreed, finding that the Johns-Manville court had extended the
time limit for removal petitions.97 The district court held, however,
that it lacked jurisdiction over the original Higgins-Pacor suit because
it was not "related to" the bankruptcy.9 8 Pacor's indemnity action
against Johns-Manville, however, was held sufficiently "related to"
the bankruptcy to allow for removal. 99
In analyzing the question of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction,
the Pacor court began by noting that Congress intended this
The court warned
jurisdiction to be broad and far-reaching.' 0
however, that bankruptcy jurisdiction had its limits, both statutory and
constitutional.10° The court also made clear that the Pacor-Higgins
action involved third parties, and thus needed some "nexus" to the
title 11 case for subject matter jurisdiction to exist. 0 2 To constitute
this nexus, the outcome of the third-party action must "alter the
debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either
positively or negatively)" and impact
"upon the handling and
'10 3
administration of the bankrupt estate.
Working off this formulation, the court concluded that the nexus
between the Higgins-Pacor action and the Johns-Manville bankruptcy
was not jurisdictionally sufficient.1" The court conceded that the
Higgins-Pacor action might give rise to an indemnification claim by
Pacor against Johns-Manville. 5 Yet, the Higgins-Pacor action would
produce no binding effect, no res judicata or collateral estoppel that
might preclude Johns-Manville from asserting its rights in the PacorJohns-Manville action for indemnity." 6 The court distinguished the
case at bar from cases where indemnification agreements between a
third-party defendant and the debtor give rise to automatic liability. 107
Had such an agreement existed in Pacor,the third-party defendant's
rights against the Johns-Manville estate would have arisen
immediately upon conclusion of the Higgins-Pacor suit. Without such
agreement, though, Pacor had to "bring an entirely separate
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102,
103.
104.
105
106.
bound
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 995.
Id.
Id. ("Since Manville is not a party to the Higgins-Pacor action, it could not be
by res judicata or collateral estoppel." (citation omitted)).
Id.
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proceeding to receive indemnification."'108 Thus, in the eyes of the
Pacor court, the possibility of indemnity confers "related to"
jurisdiction only when the outcome of the third-party action will
conclude the third-party's indemnification rights vis-A-vis the debtor.
To summarize, Pacor appears to set forth three requirements for
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction: (1) that the outcome of the
related proceeding "conceivably affect" the bankruptcy; (2) that this

effect alter the debtor's rights or liabilities; and (3) that the effect be
felt immediately, without the need for an additional proceeding.
Courts after Pacor almost invariably adopt the first requirement-

that the outcome of the third-party dispute conceivably affect the
bankruptcy.0 9 Courts often disagree, however, on what precise effect
to require. Most word their inquiry, like Pacor, in terms of legal
effect, namely the alteration of the debtor's rights or liabilities. 110

Other courts look exclusively at the potential financial impact felt by
the estate due to the outcome of third-party litigation."1
Either
formulation, however, whether in legal or monetary terms, will usually
render an identical conclusion. In the bankruptcy context, legal
108. Id.
109. More than any other proposition enunciated by Pacor, the word
"conceivable," has gained the widest currency among circuit courts adjudicating
"related to" issues. As discussed, supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text, Pacor
qualified the term "conceivable" considerably by adding the automatic liability
restriction. Yet, subsequent to Pacor,even the Third Circuit has emphasized the term
"conceivable," and in doing so broadened the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction. See In
re Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Bankruptcy
jurisdiction will exist so long as it is possible that a proceeding may impact on the
'debtor's... handling or administration of the bankrupt estate."'). According to the
Third Circuit and most other circuit courts, "conceivable" is an operative word in
itself and thus neither certainty nor likelihood of effect on the bankruptcy is necessary
to confer "related to" jurisdiction. See, e.g, In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d
1171, 1181 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Certainty, or even likelihood, is not a requirement.").
110. See, e.g., In re Smith, 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1989).
111. See, e.g., In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746, 753 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that courts
have "related to" jurisdiction when the subject of the third-party dispute is property
of the estate, or the "dispute over the asset would have an effect on the estate"); In re
Time Constr., Inc., 43 F.3d 1041, 1045 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that third-party action
was related to bankruptcy because outcome of action against sole shareholder directly
impacted the value of debtor's shares which were assets of the estate); Home Ins. Co.
v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting in dicta that the
resolution of a state court proceeding involving the debtor's sole shareholder "would
have a substantial effect on the monetary value of [debtor's] shares, and thus would
have a substantial effect on the value of [the] bankruptcy estate"). The financial
effect formulation ends up being overly broad. Imagine a shareholder derivative
action in state court against a large public company. Supposing a portion of that
company's stock composed a large share of some debtor's assets, somewhere
undergoing bankruptcy, the company could remove to federal court. This is because
the outcome of the shareholder derivative suit could severely devalue the company's
stock, and thus diminish the assets available to creditors in the otherwise unrelated
bankruptcy.
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alterations caused by third-party litigation-i.e., the debtor becoming

liable to a third-party-almost invariably result in a financial effect on
the estate, changing the distribution of assets among creditors.
A more meaningful dispute among courts arises in their approach
to Pacor's third prong-the requirement that the debtor's liability be
concluded at the outcome of third-party litigation. 112 Many courts

As
have abandoned this requirement of automatic liability." 3
discussed below, however, some courts, including perhaps the

Supreme Court, retain the prerequisite.
2. The Supreme Court's Guidance on the "Related to" Question, or
Lack Thereof
The Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,' had occasion to

resolve the varied approaches to bankruptcy jurisdiction among the
circuits, but failed to do so.1"5 The Court noted the variance, and
acknowledged Pacor as the dominant standard in the "related to"
area.1 6 The Celotex Court refrained, however, from explicitly

endorsing any circuit's approach, nor did it proffer one of its own.
The Court merely affirmed that whatever the test, "bankruptcy courts
have no jurisdiction over proceedings that have no effect on the
debtor."11' 7
It is unclear whether Pacor's requirement of automatic liability
informed the Celotex holding. In Celotex, judgment creditors in the

related action sought to execute on a bond secured by debtorCelotex's assets. 18 These assets, however, rested in the possession of
Northbrook, the third-party defendant and Celotex's guarantor on the
bond.119 Because Northbrook already had possession of these assets,
112. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
114. 514 U.S. 300 (1995) (adjudicating an action by judgment creditors in asbestos
litigation to immediately execute on a supersedeas bond against debtor's surety after
debtor lost appeal for which bond was posted). For a more complete discussion of
Celotex's intricate factual and procedural posture, see Daniel McCloskey, Celotex
Corp. v. Edwards: The Supreme Court Expands the Jurisdictionof Bankruptcy Courts
by Barring CollateralAttacks Against Their Injunctions, but Some Questions Remain
Unanswered,24 Pepp. L. Rev. 1039, 1051-55 (1997).
115. The issue in Celotex was whether the action by the judgment creditors was
"related to" the debtor's bankruptcy. See supra note 114. This issue squarely
presented the "related to" question to the Supreme Court.
116. See Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308 n.6 ("The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the Pacortest with little or no variation,
[while] [t]he Second and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, seem to have adopted a
slightly different test.").
117. Id.
118. Id. at 303.
119. Id. at 302 ("As collateral for the bond, Celotex allowed Northbrook to retain
money owed to Celotex under a settlement agreement resolving insurance coverage
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Northbrook would not have to bring a separate action to reach
Celotex's collateral if the judgment creditors succeeded in executing
on the bond. Rather, Northbrook could just hold onto what was
already in its possession.
This retention of collateral would
immediately diminish Celotex's working assets, and in the Court's
12

view, possibly destroy "any chance of a successful reorganization.'

1

3. Courts Approaching "Related to" Issues after Celotex
If Celotex, like Pacor, did indeed place import on the existence of
automatic liability, the Supreme Court may have been too subtle for
subsequent courts to catch on. Many circuits have abandoned the
prerequisite of automatic liability entirely. 12'
These courts are
perfectly willing to find "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction even over
third-party litigation whose outcome will not conclude the debtor's
liability for indemnity. 122 In these types of cases, many courts are not
concerned by the need for an extra suit to establish a third-party's
right to claim indemnity against the debtor. 23 The mere fact that the
suit is likely, or intended by the third-party, suffices to confer "related
to" jurisdiction over the pending third-party action. 12 4 The question of
likelihood often proves difficult, however, as courts speculate on the
merits of related litigation and struggle to define the precise
indemnity relationship between the debtor and the third-party
defendant. 25
disputes between Northbrook and Celotex.")
120. Id. at 304 n.4 (citing the Bankruptcy Court's decision in In re Celotex Corp.,
140 B.R. 912, 914-15 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)).
121. See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 491 (6th Cir. 1996) ("It has
become clear following Pacorthat 'automatic' liability is not necessarily a prerequisite
for a finding of 'related to' jurisdiction."). A minority of courts still require the
existence of automatic liability. See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d
368, 382 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding third-party actions unrelated "because any
indemnification claims that the [third-party defendants] might have against Debtors
have not yet accrued and would require another lawsuit before they could have an
impact on Federal-Mogul's bankruptcy proceeding").
122. See, e.g., In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475-76 (1st Cir. 1991) (conceding
the lack of an indemnity agreement between the debtor and the third party
defendant, but upholding "related to" jurisdiction nonetheless).
123. This was the situation in Pacor,where if the plaintiffs prevailed against Pacor,
it would take an additional Pacor-Manville lawsuit to establish Pacor's right to claim
indemnity against Johns-Manville. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g, In re Titan Energy Inc., 837 F.2d 325, 330 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[E]ven a
proceeding which portends a mere contingent or tangential effect on a debtor's estate
meets the broad jurisdictional test [for 'related to' jurisdiction]."); see generally
Collier, supra note 26, 3.01[4][c], at 3-27 ("'[Ajutomatic' liability of the estate is not
the sine qua non for related to jurisdiction; all that is necessary is that there could
'conceivably' be some effect upon the estate as a consequence of the litigation in
question.").
125. See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul Global, 300 F.3d at 376 (reasoning that although
an indemnification agreement existed that could "plausibly support a claim" against
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Other courts partly adhere to Pacor's requirement of automatic
liability, distinguishing situations involving indemnity rights from
those where the debtor is liable for contribution to a third-party
According to these courts, in the contribution
defendant. 2 6
scenario-where the debtor and the defendant are jointly and
severally liable to a third-party plaintiff-"the statute does not require
a finding of definite liability of the estate as a condition precedent to
holding an action related to a bankruptcy proceeding. ' 127 The
rationale for this distinction is difficult to identify. Perhaps the
situation where the debtor is co-liable to a third-party plaintiff is
qualitatively different from the debtor being liable only to the thirdparty defendant. In the former case, courts might not worry about
forcing the plaintiff into federal court. But for the automatic stay, that
plaintiff presumably would have named the debtor as co-defendant
anyway, thus conferring federal jurisdiction. 128 In the latter case,
however, where the debtor is only liable to the third-party defendant
(not the plaintiff), courts arguably have no place disrupting that
plaintiff's choice of a state forum.
Fairness to litigants and the efficiency of the bankruptcy system are
not the only concerns that lead courts to divergent results in "related
to" cases. As Part II discusses, constitutional difficulties add another
dimension to the "related to" problem, sparking debate among
scholars and suggesting further limitations to the "related to" grant.

the debtor, the agreement's "boiler-plate" indemnification language was not likely to
do so); G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d at 1476 (speculating on whether or not the third party
defendant would assert an indemnity claim against the debtor). In G.S.F. Corp., there
was no indemnity agreement between the debtor and the third party defendants. Id.
Instead, Chase, the third-party defendant, had filed a proof of claim, preserving its
rights to claim indemnity against the debtor, G.S.F. Id. Yet, Chase would only be
entitled to proceed against G.S.F. for indemnity if the waiver of administrative
expenses were construed so as not to bar a claim. Id. This was not an issue properly
before the court. Id. Nevertheless, the court went through the statutory analysis to
determine the extent of Chase's indemnity rights against G.S.F., all to decide the
jurisdictional question. Id.
126. Contribution is the right of one party, who has discharged a common liability,
to recover from the party who shared the liability, the portion which it ought to pay.
Indemnity on the other hand is where one person is compelled to pay, but another
really should have paid, and thus a contract to reimburse or indemnify is implied by
law. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(4) (3d ed. 1993).
127. In re Salem Mortgage Co., 783 F.2d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 1986) ("In distinguishing
Pacor, we note that the parties in the mortgage transactions in this proceeding are
more intertwined than the parties in Pacor.").
128. The plaintiff would have a claim against the debtor's estate pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 502 (2000), thus granting federal courts "arising under" bankruptcy
jurisdiction.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES TO EXPLAIN AND DEFINE THE
SCOPE OF "RELATED TO" BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court in Celotex resounded Pacor'swarning 129 of an
eventual "constitutional . . . limitation to the power of a bankruptcy
court.""13
That limitation is not readily apparent, however, from
either the code or the case law. Instead, it will depend on how we
explain the constitutionality of "related to" jurisdiction. A correct

and persuasive constitutional explanation will work to define the
proper scope of "related to" jurisdiction, and in turn guide judicial
analysis of "related to" questions.
Article III of the Constitution limits federal judicial power largely
to the adjudication of federal questions.131 "Related to" actions, then,

must either be federal questions in their own right or present logical
supplements to a federal suit.

At first blush, much "related to"

litigation appears to satisfy neither of these Article III requirements.
13 2
"Related to" actions, by definition, consist of state substantive law,
and are often factually unrelated to the predicate bankruptcy. Yet,
Congress intended a broad "related to" grant,'33 and courts have
consistently construed it as such. 3
As this part analyzes, commentators have developed various

constitutional theories to explain the expansive reach of bankruptcy
jurisdiction.

Part II.A. explores what is commonly known as

protective jurisdiction, a theory used to justify the federal adjudication
of cases not directly presenting issues of substantive federal law. Part

II.B. describes analogies to forms of supplemental jurisdiction, drawn
by commentators to show how "related to" actions work as logical
supplements to federal question cases.
A. Protective Jurisdiction
Theories of protective jurisdiction can be traced as far back as
Justice Marshall's famous Osborn opinion,'35 but have taken various
shapes and forms in subsequent years.'3 6 Generally, the theory posits
129. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300,308 (1995).
130. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).
131. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
132. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
133. See House Report, supra note 20, at 43-48.
134. See, e.g., Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994 ("Congress intended to grant comprehensive
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and
expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.").
135. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824). The Osborn Court
reasoned that federal jurisdiction should protect the rights of federally created
institutions, such as a national bank, and thus should extend to litigation where such
an institution is a party. Id. at 824-26.
136. Compare Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983)
(holding that because Congress has, pursuant to its Article I powers, broadly enacted
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that, where an active and articulated congressional legislative program

is at stake, federal jurisdiction serves the purposes of the "arising
under" clause in Article III,137 even though the particular cases may
involve only state substantive law.'3 8 The theory would allow
Congress to jurisdictionally protect the general interests of a
legislative program, even though Congress has failed to legislate on
the particular issue before the court.'39 The Supreme Court has

wavered on its amenability to general theories of protective
jurisdiction, and has never explicitly adopted one to justify federal
jurisdiction over state law claims where diversity or a § 1331 federal
question is lacking. 4 '

rules of decision governing the sovereign immunity of foreign nations, any action
against a foreign sovereign "accordingly 'arises under' federal law, within the meaning
of Art. 1II"), with Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 600-04
(1949) (holding that Congress may, pursuant to its Article I powers, authorize Article
III courts to adjudicate cases not falling within the Article III enumeration).
137. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
138. A common example of this type of legislative program comes from the labor
context, where the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000), provides for federal
jurisdiction over actions for violation of labor-management contracts. For general
discussions of protective jurisdiction, see Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction:
Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 90-91 (2d ed. 1990); Carole E. GoldbergAmbrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 542
(1983); Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of ProtectiveJurisdiction,57 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 933 (1982).
139. Herbert Wechsler and Paul Mishkin each have advanced rationales for
Congress's right to confer protective federal jurisdiction. Wechsler offers a logical
greater-includes-the-lesser argument, contending that, wherever Congress has the
constitutional power to prescribe federal rules of decision, it may, without so doing,
enact a naked jurisdictional statute which will provide a federal forum to govern
substantive rules of decision, state and federal. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert
Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 744-47 (1953) ("[I]f Congress
could ... pass substantive legislation on a particular matter, then this 'greater' power
logically includes within it the 'lesser' power to provide the federal courts with
jurisdiction over cases in the area."). Mishkin offers a narrower view, arguing that
"where there is an articulated and active federal policy regulating a field," Congress
may grant federal jurisdiction to protect it even though Congress has not addressed
the particular issue before the court. Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the
DistrictCourts,53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 191-92 (1953).
140. The first case to explicitly address protective jurisdiction was Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (holding that section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act, which confers federal jurisdiction over labor-management
disputes in industries affecting commerce, reflected a congressional intent to create
federal common law of labor and, therefore, supplied the requisite federal question).
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Frankfurter contended that theories of protective
jurisdiction "cannot be justified under any view of the allowable scope to be given to
Article III." Id. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Later Courts have not been quite
as harsh as Frankfurter would have liked, but have nevertheless refrained from
adopting any theory of protective jurisdiction. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121,
137 (1989) ("We have, in the past, not found the need to adopt a theory of 'protective
jurisdiction' to support Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction, and we do not see any
need for doing so here because we do not recognize any federal interests that are not
protected by limiting removal to situations in which a federal defense is alleged."
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If theories of protective jurisdiction are correct, they seem a perfect
justification for an expansive model of bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Article I of the Constitution enables Congress to establish "uniform

'
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."141
Moreover, Congress has in
fact legislated extensively in the area of bankruptcy. Logically, it

follows that Congress should have the power to confer broad federal
jurisdiction to protect its established program.
"Related to"

jurisdiction appears to function as just such protection. When state
law litigation threatens to delay an ongoing bankruptcy, and thereby
disrupt the integrity and efficiency of a federal legislative system,
Congress should be able to bring that litigation within the scope of
federal judicial power.
This is essentially the argument advanced by Thomas Galligan, Jr.,
who proposes that "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction works as a

valid form of protective jurisdiction. 42 Under his model, Congress, in
enacting the Bankruptcy Code, evidently perceived independent value
in a federal tribunal for all claims incident to bankruptcy. Galligan
argues that Congress's legislative prerogatives include extending
federal judicial power to state law claims, and so any case falling
under the bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions "arises under" federal
law for purposes of Article 11I.143
B. Ancillary and SupplementalJurisdiction

Some commentators analogize "related to" jurisdiction to concepts
of ancillary or supplemental jurisdiction--doctrines that allow federal

courts to hear state grounds for recovery when they are joined to
factually-related federal grounds.1"

John T. Cross argues that

(citation omitted)); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491 n.17 ("[Wie need not consider
petitioner's.., argument that the Act is constitutional as an aspect of so-called
'protective jurisdiction."'). Justice Jackson, writing for the plurality in Tidewater, 337
U.S. at 588-601, argued that where an active and articulated federal program is at
stake, Congress may, pursuant to its Article I "necessary and proper" powers, extend
federal judicial power to state-law claims. Yet, Jackson's rationale failed to receive
majority support, and a majority of the Court advanced alternate reasoning that
dismissed protective jurisdiction as a legitimate rationale. See id. at 607-16 (Rutledge,
J., concurring); id. at 626-45 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 646-52 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
141. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
142. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Article III and the "Related To" Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction:A Case Study in Protective Jurisdiction,11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 1, 4143 (1987).
143. Id. at 2-3. There is some evidence that Congress had theories of protective
jurisdiction in mind when drafting 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000). See House Report, supra
note 20, at 47-48 ("There appears to be no reason why Congress cannot in the
exercise of its power under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution confer
jurisdiction over all litigation having a significant connection with bankruptcy."
(citation omitted)).
144. See generally United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Gibbs
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"related to" jurisdiction is best understood as a species of ancillary
jurisdiction. 45 In this model, the bankruptcy case constitutes a base
federal question.'46 To the extent that a state law claim bears relation
to that bankruptcy case, a federal court can hear the state claim as
ancillary to the federal question.147 Cross's analogy opens itself to
criticism, however, by requiring an expanded definition of ancillary
jurisdiction, one in which the ancillary claim need only bear a "logical
relationship" to the bankruptcy, rather than the usually-required
factual nexus.'48 Ordinarily, for ancillary jurisdiction to exist, the state
and federal claims must arise out of the same transaction. 149 Cross

answers this criticism by explaining that his model does not treat
ancillary jurisdiction as an independent basis for federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Rather, Congress, in enacting § 1334, merely intended
the "related to" grant to act in a way analogous to doctrines of
ancillary jurisdiction.1 50

In a similar attempt to explain the constitutionality of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, Ralph Brubaker likens "related to" jurisdiction to
statutory exercises of supplemental jurisdiction. 51 Brubaker proposes
involved "pendent" jurisdiction, which concerns the resolution of a plaintiff's federal
and state-law claims against a single defendant in one action. Id. Ancillary
jurisdiction, by contrast, involves state law claims asserted against a defendant
different from the one against whom the federal claim is asserted. See generally 16
Moore et al., supra note 27, § 106.04[1], at 106-16.
145. See John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to
Disputes Outside Article III: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy,
87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1188, 1251 (1993). The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction evolved to
allow defendants to assert related state law claims in a federal lawsuit, even though no
independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists for those claims. See Moore v. N.Y.
Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926) (coining the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in its
modern form).
146. See Cross, supra note 145, at 1235.
147. Id.
148. Moore, 270 U.S. at 609-10. This is based on factual relatedness akin to the
Gibbs "common nucleus of operative fact" test. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
149. See Moore et al., supra note 27, § 106.04[1], at 106-16.
150. According to Cross, it is the statutory language, not the common law
doctrines, which define the proper scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Cross, supra
note 145, at 1237, 1244.
151. See Brubaker, supra note 71, at 752-53. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) provides
that "[federal] district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution." Brubaker's argument is similar to that of Cross, supra note 145, but
relies on § 1367, rather than common law doctrines of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction. Brubaker also criticizes Cross's depiction of related state-law claims as
ancillary to a bankruptcy "case." According to Brubaker, Cross's model rests on an
outdated in rem theory of bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Brubaker, supra note 71, at 832
("The bankruptcy 'case' is not the primary jurisdictional unit in bankruptcy;
individual bankruptcy proceedings present the justiciable controversies for exercise of
the federal judicial power in bankruptcy.").
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that we view the bankruptcy estate as a federal entity as per Osborn, 15 2
rather than a jurisdictional res. 53 In this model, all in personam
claims by and against the estate constitute traditional federal
questions. In a fashion similar to the way § 1367 empowers a federal
court to hear claims "supplemental" to federal questions, so to1 5does
§
4
1334 enable that court to hear "related to" third-party disputes.
Analogies to supplemental and ancillary jurisdiction have
considerable basis in the Bankruptcy Code's legislative history. The
1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act's jurisdictional scheme was justified as a
policy matter on precisely the same grounds of "procedural
convenience, fairness, and judicial economy" that drove the parallel
creation of supplemental jurisdiction.'55 Moreover, as Susan BlockLieb has noted, Congress, in other statutes, consistently uses 15 the
6
phrase "related to" to indicate grants of supplemental jurisdiction.
III. THE MISSING LINK: How FILING A PROOF OF CLAIM RESOLVES
CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES AND ACCOMMODATES POLICIES IN
TENSION

The constitutional approaches discussed in Part II yield varying
practical limitations on the scope of "related to" jurisdiction.
Protective jurisdiction would seem to allow for an almost limitless
"related to" grant. Analogies to supplemental jurisdiction, on the
other hand, would limit the "related to" power by testing for factual
relatedness between the bankruptcy and related proceedings. Part
III.A. presents problems with a protective theory of bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Part III.B. concludes that analogies to supplemental
jurisdiction best explain the constitutionality of § 1334's "related to"
provision. Yet, as Part III.B. explains, the current "conceivable
effect" test often upholds federal jurisdiction over "related to" actions
that would fail the traditionally fact-based standards of supplemental
jurisdiction. Thus, Parts III.C. and III.D. offer, as a substitute for the
"conceivable effect" test, a procedural measure to ensure "related to"
actions form valid supplements to federal question cases. Finally, Part
III.E. asserts that a proof of claim requirement accommodates policies
in tension.
152. See supra note 135. For purposes of federal jurisdiction, the bankruptcy estate
would function as the National Bank did in Osborn.
153. See Brubaker, supra note 71, at 844.
154. Provided, according to Brubaker, they share a "conventional supplemental
relationship" to a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 753.
155. Id. at 850-51.
156. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction:A Constitutional,Statutory, and Policy Analysis, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 721,
780-81 & nn.338-42 (1994) (listing examples from the copyright, trademark, and
patent contexts).
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A. Problems with a Protective Theory of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Theories of protective jurisdiction generally conflict with a
traditional understanding of Article III "as both the source and limits
of the federal judicial power."1'57 Article III enumerates but one
1 58
specific category of protective jurisdiction-diversity of citizenship.
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, it does not appear that
the Framers intended any more protective jurisdiction other than that
over citizens of different states. Otherwise, the Constitution would
provide for more such categories. Moreover, a theory of protective
jurisdiction would impose no discernible limits on federal judicial
power. As one commentator rightly put it, "[g]iven the nearly
limitless field of Congress's Article I concerns, [a protective
jurisdiction] approach to federal jurisdiction could, indeed, undermine
any intended checks against endless encroachments of the federal
judicial power into a protected sphere of state autonomy over the
development and administration of state law." 15 9
As applied to the bankruptcy context, theories of protective
jurisdiction would yield absurd practical results. Under Wechsler's
"greater includes the lesser" model of protective jurisdiction,16
Congress could theoretically extend jurisdiction to the transactions of
any person who at any point was bankrupt or was likely to become
bankrupt. 1 ' In redacting the provisions of Article III, the Framers
likely did not intend for federal jurisdiction to reach this far.
Moreover, the legislative history of § 1334 shows congressional intent
for the expanse of "related to" jurisdiction to stop only at the limits
imposed by the Constitution.'6 2 As a constitutional guide, protective
jurisdiction provides no workable boundaries to constrain the "related

to" grant.'63

157. Brubaker, supra note 71, at 809; see also Textile Workers Union of Ala. v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474-75 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System
417 (5th ed. 2003) (terming "classical" the "proposition that the federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction with no authority to adjudicate except in the instances
specifically enumerated in Article III").
158. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 476 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (finding theories of general protective jurisdiction "inconsistent with
Article III's recognition of 'protective jurisdiction' only in the specified situation of
diverse citizenship").
159. Brubaker, supra note 71, at 810 (citation omitted).
160. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
161. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
162. Congress, while intending the "related to" grant to be "broad" and
"expanded," spoke nothing of any limits, either in the statutory language or in the
congressional report. See House Report, supra note 20, at 13. By this silence,
Congress appears to have intended to allow bankruptcy jurisdiction to extend as far as
courts, and ultimately Article III, would allow.
163. See Brubaker, supra note 71, at 812 ("'Related to' bankruptcy jurisdiction is
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The Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed protective
jurisdiction as a valid constitutional explanation for bankruptcy
jurisdiction."
In his Lincoln Mills dissent, Justice Frankfurter
commented in dicta that bankruptcy jurisdiction "may be deemed to
sweep within its scope interests analytically outside the 'federal
question' category, but sufficiently related to the main purpose of
bankruptcy to call for comprehensive treatment."' 165 Frankfurter was
referring, however, to plenary cases brought by a trustee under state
law to recover property. 166 Regarding "related to" third-party
litigation, it is unlikely that Frankfurter would consider Congress's
bankruptcy power to justify exceeding the traditional limits of Article
111.167

B. The Weaknesses of Analogies of Supplemental Jurisdiction
Brubaker and Cross's theories run up against one general difficulty,
namely that certain "related to" actions fail conventional tests for
supplemental and ancillary jurisdiction.
Courts typically limit
exercises of supplemental jurisdiction to state law claims arising out of
the same "nucleus of operative fact" as their federal counterparts.16 8
If the Constitution compels such a common-law standard to ensure
supplemental claims form part of a justiciable Article III "case,"169
analogies to supplemental jurisdiction fail to constitutionally justify a
jurisdictional scheme where bankruptcy-related disputes often share
little factual overlap with an "arising under" claim. 7 '
not self-defining, and protective jurisdiction theory as a referent provides no readily
discernible limits, much like the prevailing test for 'related to' bankruptcy jurisdiction
itself." (citation omitted)).
164, See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
165. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 483 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
166. Recall the summary/plenary jurisdictional system under the 1898 Act,
discussed supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
167. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 483-84 ("If there is in the phrase 'arising under
the laws of the United States' leeway for expansion of our concepts of jurisdiction, the
history of Article III suggests that the area is not great ... )
168. See supra note 148.
169. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a
claim 'arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States' ... and the
relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the
entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case'.... The
state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.
Id.
170. Another difficulty is that ancillary jurisdiction generally works as a much
narrower concept allowing only the court hearing the initial federal claim to hear
related nonfederal claims. See Cross, supra note 145, at 1237. Typically, ancillary
jurisdiction requires not only that the various claims logically form a single case, but
also that the federal court hear the claims as one case. Id. Because bankruptcy
jurisdiction allows "a 'splitting' of the federal case into its constituent federal and
nonfederal components, they do not fit neatly within current theories of ancillary
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For example, it is difficult to find a federal bankruptcy claim arising
out of the same facts as, say, a related divorce proceeding between a
bankruptcy debtor and her husband. It is unlikely that the bankruptcy
petition itself so arises, unless the divorce forced the debtor to file.
Perhaps the divorce shares facts common to other bankruptcy
proceedings such as disputes regarding preference payments,
fraudulent transfers, exempt property, etc. Similarly, however, none
of these disputes is likely to arise from the personal circumstances
between the debtor and her husband that gave rise to the divorce.
Yet, courts will at times extend federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to the
divorce proceeding on the basis that its outcome will affect the
amount of property available for distribution to creditors.1 7'
Traditional doctrines of supplemental jurisdiction fail to fully
reconcile this outcome with Article III.
1. Conceptually Broadening the Constitutional Case
The dilemma can be resolved if we consider, as several
commentators have, that pragmatic, not constitutional concerns,
motivate the factual standards of relatedness currently in place
outside of the bankruptcy context.'72 Denis McLaughlin and Richard
Matasar both understand Article III's "Case" requirement as broad
enough to embrace supplemental claims sharing less factual overlap
with federal claims than Gibbs requires.'7 3 If correct, these theories of
Article III justify expansive "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. The
potential effect of a third party action on a bankruptcy provides a
"logical relationship" between state and federal claims. Such a

jurisdiction." Id. (citation omitted)
171. See, e.g., Christie v. Chong, No. C-02-0472, 2002 WL 598428, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (holding a divorce proceeding involving allocation of debtor's property at least
"related to" the bankruptcy, but remanding on abstention grounds).
172. These pragmatic concerns, as the Gibbs Court noted, include "considerations
of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." 383 U.S. at 726.
173. See Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One ConstitutionalCase": Procedural
Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction,71 Cal. L.
Rev. 1401 (1983) (contending that the only limit to supplemental jurisdiction is the
existence of a case or controversy as defined under lawfully adopted procedural rules
for the joinder of claims and parties, and that no common nucleus of operative fact is
constitutionally required). Yet, acceptance of Matasar's view might give Congress too
much power to extend subject matter jurisdiction, merely by expanding joinder rules.
McLaughlin similarly understands the Article III "case or controversy" as consisting
"of all claims that bear some 'logical relationship' to the original jurisdiction claim
sufficient to justify joinder of the claims in a single action, irrespective of the precise
nature of the nexus that establishes the logical relationship." Denis F. McLaughlin,
The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitutional and Statutory
Analysis, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 849, 910 (1992) (citation omitted).
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C. A ProceduralAlternative to Resolve ConstitutionalDoubt
Perhaps expansive "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction does not
require such an enlarged view of the Article III "Case." Is there
really no bankruptcy proceeding with which typical third-party
litigation shares a common factual basis? Take In re WorldCom, Inc.
Securities Litigation,75 for example. There, city pension funds sued
WorldCom's former executives, directors, underwriters, and
accountants for securities fraud.176 The defendants sought removal on
the basis that their litigation was related to the WorldCom bankruptcy
commenced several months earlier.'77 Defendants argued that their
litigation was related to the WorldCom case because, inter alia, the
defendants had entered into agreements with WorldCom that
included promises to indemnify.'78 Moreover, because the defendants
and WorldCom were potentially jointly and severally liable to the
pension funds, the defendants had contribution rights against
WorldCom should they be found liable. 179 According to the court,
these indemnification and contribution rights, "conceivabl[y]" giving
rise to claims against the estate, created "related to" jurisdiction over
the third-party litigation. 180
In this scenario, it appears that the pension fund's claim and the
accountant's indemnity rights indeed arose out of a "common nucleus
of operative fact."
Were it not for WorldCom and its agents'
fraudulent bond offerings, the pension fund would not have sued.
And without the fund's lawsuit, the directors and other defendants
would not have claimed indemnity or contribution rights against the
estate. Thus, the factual basis-the securities fraud-in effect gave
rise to the claims both of the third-party plaintiff against the
defendant, and the third-party defendant against the estate.
The above analysis leaves one glaring question unresolved, namely
whether or not the third-party defendant's indemnification rights
constitute a real federal question.
Arguably, the third-party
defendant possesses only a contingent right to indemnity at the time
"related to" jurisdiction is at issue. If the third-party defendant has
not yet judicially asserted that right, the supplemental jurisdiction
analogy fails, as there is no base federal question, merely the potential
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See McLaughlin, supra note 173, at 910.
293 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 311.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 321.
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for one. This section demonstrates that when the defendant files a
proof of claim pursuant to § 501, the previously unasserted
indemnification rights now "arise under" the Bankruptcy Code,
becoming predicate federal questions to which "related to" claims can
attach.
The Bankruptcy Code defines what constitutes a "claim" against
the estate very broadly, so as to include even rights that are contingent
on the occurrence of some future event. 181 Courts typically treat
indemnification rights as falling within this broad definition of
"claim."
Sometimes indemnification rights arise from express
agreement; other times the rights accrue through common-law
principles of quasi-contract. For timing purposes, courts consider
indemnity rights to become "claims" either at the moment the parties
enter the indemnity agreement, or absent an express contract, at the
moment the underlying suit is brought, the outcome of which would
trigger indemnification.182
Once a creditor has a valid claim against the bankruptcy estate, the
creditor can preserve the claim by filing a "proof of claim" with the
bankruptcy court pursuant to § 501.183 Without an allowed proof of
claim, the creditor cannot share in the distribution of the estate. In a
chapter 11 business reorganization, a debt-holder without a proof of
claim cannot be treated as a creditor for purposes of voting on a plan
and distribution of dividends."8 In effect, until filing a proof of claim,
a creditor's rights do not affect the bankruptcy.
Despite the broad definition of claim set forth by § 101(5), some
claims may be disallowed under § 502.185 Particularly relevant here is
§ 502(e) which instructs the bankruptcy court to disallow "any claim
for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is liable with the
debtor"'8 6 to the extent that "such claim for reimbursement or
contribution is contingent as of the time of allowance or
disallowance."' 87 The purpose of 502(e) is to "prevent... competition
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(a) (2000) (defining a claim to include any right whether
or not such right has been "reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured"); see generally 2 Collier,supra note 26, 101.05[1], at 101-25 to 101-28.
182. See, e.g., In re Frenville Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 332, 336-37 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating in
dicta that indemnification resulting from an indemnity contract arises upon the
signing of an indemnification agreement, and ultimately holding that a non-contract
based indemnification claim arises when the cause of action for the underlying
negligence action is brought).
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) ("A creditor or an indenture trustee may file a proof of
claim."); infra note 205 and accompanying text (listing cases that look to the existence
of proof of claim as a primary factor in testing for relatedness).
184. See 4 Collier,supra note 26, $ 501.01[2], at 501-4.
185. See 11 U.S.C. § 502; see generally 4 Collier,supra note 26, 502.02, at 502-9.

186. 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1).
187. Id. § 502(e)(1)(B).
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between a creditor and [its] guarantor for limited proceeds of the
estate."' 88
Further, courts have interpreted "reimbursement" to
include indemnity claims.'89
Thus, in a scenario like In re WorldCom,19 ° § 502(e) might preclude
the directors from filing a proof of claim against the estate. The
pension fund in In re WorldCom would have sued both WorldCom
and its directors as co-defendants but for WorldCom's bankruptcy
petition, which stayed the plaintiff's suit as to WorldCom. Filing the
bankruptcy petition turned the pension fund into a creditor with a
claim against the bankruptcy estate. If the directors are found liable
to the pension fund, they too possess a fixed claim against the
WorldCom estate. By disallowing the directors' contingent claims for
indemnity or contribution where the directors are co-liable with
WorldCom, § 502(e) ensures that the WorldCom estate will not have
to double pay on essentially the same claim.' 9' Thus, for any charge
on which a court could find the directors jointly liable with
WorldCom, the bankruptcy court would disallow a proof of claim.
However, § 502(e)(1) does not apply where WorldCom is liable to
the directors purely for contractual indemnification, triggered by the
directors becoming liable to the pension fund on the underlying
securities fraud.'92 Article X, section 2 of WorldCom's by-laws
provided that WorldCom would indemnify and advance expenses to
its directors "to the fullest extent permitted under" Georgia
corporations law.' 93
This provision permitted the directors to
immediately recoup costs incurred in the underlying litigation,
regardless of whether or not a judgment had been rendered.'94 Thus,
the directors had immediate, unobjectionable proofs of claim to file
against the WorldCom estate.
In fact, the directors in In re
WorldCom did so file, including a proof of claim for over five million
188. House Report, supra note 20, at 354.
189. See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 146 B.R. 92, 95 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992 (citing In re Wedtech Corp., 85 B.R. 285, 289 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988))).
190. For a discussion of the factual circumstances of the case, see supra notes 17580 and accompanying text.
191. See In re White Motor Corp., 731 F.2d 372,374 (6th Cir. 1984).
192. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 154 B.R. 416, 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding that, for § 502(e)(1) to apply, there must be a "sharingof a liability" and that
"although the source of liability may differ, each debtor must be liable to the same
party for essentially the same claim" (citation omitted)).
193. Restated
By-Laws
of
WorldCom,
Inc.,
at
http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/worldcombylaws.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 2004). This contractual indemnity supplied one of the directors' arguments
for "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293
B.R. 308, 320 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
194. See Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-856(c) (2003) (providing, subject to several
conditions, that "a corporation may advance or reimburse expenses incurred in
advance of final disposition of the proceeding").
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dollars in legal fees.195 These filings force immediate recognition of
the director-defendants as a major creditor in the WorldCom
bankruptcy and should per se confer "related to" jurisdiction over the
underlying securities litigation.
This argument carries the natural corollary that had the directordefendants failed to file proofs of claims against the estate by the time
they sought removal, bankruptcy jurisdiction would not extend to the
securities lawsuit. This result may seem the product of form over
function, but constitutionally it makes sense. As explained earlier,
analogies to supplemental jurisdiction work somewhat well to explain
Congress's power to confer "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction on
federal courts. 96 This model requires, however, a base federal
question for the state law claims to supplement. If there is no proof of
claim against the bankruptcy estate-no "arising under" federal
question in the cumulative Article III "case"-constitutional
uncertainty taints the extension of federal judicial power to the state
law litigation. Although somewhat formal, the proof of claim
requirement is a procedural hurdle easily cleared by a third-party
defendant seeking to remove. The defendant need only file a proof of
claim sometime prior to his motion for removal.
D. The Proofof Claim Condition and the Case Law
The proof of claim requirement also provides an easy answer to the
common-law methods for testing "related to" jurisdiction. Without a
proof of claim, a third-party defendant is entitled to none of the
privileges bankruptcy law affords creditors, and thus his third-party
lawsuit cannot affect either distribution or reorganization. Logically
then, state law litigation has no immediate effect, either financial or
legal, on a bankruptcy until the third-party defendant has filed a proof
of claim. Although the right to payment from the debtor is contingent
on the outcome of the third-party litigation, a filed proof of claim
forces the bankruptcy court to consider the claimant in deciding
distribution or plans for reorganization. Conversely, if the bankruptcy
court disallows a proof of claim pursuant to § 502,197 then that claim
cannot affect the bankruptcy, and thus neither can the state law action
from which it derives.

195. See In re WorldCom, 293 B.R. at 320-21 & n.18 (noting that the director
defendants filed proofs of claim "in the WorldCom bankruptcy proceeding seeking
reimbursement for defense costs and asserting tort and contract claims against
WorldCom in addition to the contractual and statutory indemnity and contribution
claims").
196. See supra notes 144-80 and accompanying text.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2000); see supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
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E. Proofs of Claim and Bankruptcy Policy
Requiring a proof of claim also strikes the appropriate balance
among competing policies. The requirement at once both eliminates
the expense and delay attendant to piecemeal litigation and ensures
that "related to" jurisdiction does not sweep too broadly. The
"related to" provision causes bankruptcy courts to hear many more
lawsuits than they normally would absent such expansive judicial
reach.
Bankruptcy courts must avoid wasting limited judicial
resources on state law litigation having no immediate effect on a
bankruptcy. Requiring a proof of claim ensures that they do not.
Armed with this requirement, bankruptcy courts will not have to halt
the bankruptcy process to wait out pending third-party litigation.
Instead they can reason that the only outcomes worth waiting for are
those where the third-party defendant has preserved his rights and
filed a proof of claim. Only then can the third-party litigation
potentially restructure distribution among creditors when it ends. If
that third-party has not yet filed a proof of claim, and the bankruptcy
judge faces an impending jurisdiction decision, the judge can merely
set a quickly approaching bar date.19 s This forces the third-party
defendant to either file a proof of claim and remove, or refrain from
filing and pursue his future claim outside bankruptcy.
A common criticism of expansive bankruptcy jurisdiction is that it
intrudes into the judicial provinces normally reserved to the states. 199
The broader the "related to" grant, the more state courts lose the
right to adjudicate claims that arise in their territory, involve their law,
and demand their expertise. Having a filed proof of claim as the only
condition precedent to federal jurisdiction may at times offend states'
rights. However, the abstention provisions of § 133420 exist to protect
state courts and states' rights.20 1 Moreover, an overly narrow

198. Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) sets forth a default ninety days, beginning after the
first meeting of creditors, within which a creditor must file its proof of claim. Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 3002(c); see generally 4 Collier,supra note 26, 501.02[5][a][i], at 501-14.
Additionally, Rule 3003(c)(3) empowers bankruptcy courts to fix their own claims bar
date, which the court may then strictly enforce. See 4 Collier, supra note 26, 1
501.02[5][b][i], at 501-15.
199. See In re FedPak Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 207, 214 (7th Cir. 1996) (favoring a narrow
"related to" standard "to prevent the expansion of federal jurisdiction over disputes
that are best resolved by the state courts"); In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784,
787-88 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that overbroad construction of "related to"
jurisdiction may bring into federal court matters that should be decided by state
courts); Lori J. Forlano, Note, Why Bankruptcy "Related To" JurisdictionShould Not
Reach Mass Tort Nondebtor Codefendants, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1627, 1645-46 (1998)
(arguing that the case for allowing state courts to adjudicate state-created rights is
strongest in the mass tort context).
200. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
201. See House Report, supra note 20, at 51.
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interpretation of the "related to" language would render these
abstention provisions largely irrelevant. °2
Critics of a broad reading of the "related to" grant also argue that a
bankruptcy court should not interfere with a plaintiff's right
concerning forum selection. 20 3 The proof of claim requirement might
be vulnerable to this criticism as it allows the defendant of a thirdparty lawsuit to "hijack" state law litigation by filing a proof of claim
and removing to federal court. Arguably, however, the broader
"conceivable effect" test allows the defendant even more forum
control. Under that test, the defendant can "hijack" the lawsuit as
soon as there is even a distant possibility that he will pursue his
indemnification rights against the debtor.
Courts justify this
disruption of plaintiff's forum choice by citing the countervailing
interest in an efficient bankruptcy system. More than any other
standard, the proof of claim requirement ensures that courts only
disrupt the plaintiff's forum choice when these efficiency interests
actually are achieved.
Forum selection problems may arise in the converse situation as
well-where the plaintiff seeks original "related to" jurisdiction in a
federal court, but the defendant has not yet filed a proof of claim.
The proof of claim requirement may allow defendant to stay in state
court as long as he wants. However, in the overwhelming number of
"related to" questions, it is the plaintiff, not the defendant, who
wishes to remain in state court. Moreover, the third-party defendant
will likely have a substantial interest in filing a proof of claim sooner
rather than later. Without doing so, the defendant will forgo his rights
to both the proceeds of the debtor's estate and to a vote on the plan
for reorganization. Once the third-party defendant files a proof of
claim, the plaintiff would be free to remove to federal court pursuant
to § 1452(a). 2 4
202. Critics argue, on federalism grounds, that abstention provisions alone cannot
"cure a jurisdictional defect." Forlano, supra note 199, at 1647 & n.148; see also
Lemco Gypsum, 910 F.2d at 788 n.16 (noting that abstention provisions only partially
address comity issues). Yet, conditioning removal on the filing of a proof of claim
sufficiently restrains the "related to" provision to dispel any constitutional
uncertainty. With the jurisdictional defect already cured, therefore, the abstention
provisions serve their proper function-i.e., balancing federal and state interests; the
interests of the bankruptcy system with the interests of local litigants and local courts.
203. See, e.g., E. Scott Fruehwald, The Related to Subject Matter Jurisdiction of
Bankruptcy Courts, 44 Drake L. Rev. 1, 31 (1995).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (2000). Unlike the general statutory removal provision for
other federal questions, § 1452(a) does not condition removal on a district court
having original jurisdiction, nor does it require the defendant to seek removal.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which
the district courts of the United States have originaljurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant.. ") (emphases added), with 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) ("A party may
remove any claim ... to the district court for the district ... if such district court has
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CONCLUSION

The area of "related to" jurisdiction is one of erratic case law,
competing policies, and constitutional difficulty. As this Note has
demonstrated, the proof of claim requirement will bring needed
consistency to the field, preserving judicial resources and building a
concrete, predictable jurisprudence. The change will not require
wholesale overhaul of the current "related to" analysis. In fact, some
courts already look to the existence of a proof of claim as a primary
factor in testing for relatedness. 2°5 Given the current frequency with
which jurisdictional issues are litigated, courts should strive to evolve
this trend into a hard and fast rule that at once reduces jurisdictional
litigation, preserves the speed and efficiency of the bankruptcy
system, and complies with Article III.
The proof of claim
requirement, as a bright-line procedural rule, will greatly reduce
litigation of jurisdictional issues. At the same time, the rule sweeps
within its scope any action so affecting a bankruptcy as to demand its
immediate adjudication by a federal court. Finally, the rule ensures
that the nearly limitless "related to" grant respects the jurisdictional
boundaries established by Article III of the Constitution.

jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.").
205. See, e.g., In re Best Reception Sys., Inc., 220 B.R. 932, 944 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1998) (deeming third-party proceedings to be related because third-party defendant
filed a proof of claim, demonstrating intent to seek indemnification from debtor); In
re U.S. Brass Corp., 173 B.R. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) ("[I]f a proceeding
is related to the underlying bankruptcy by virtue of an indemnification agreement
against debtor, there must be something to evidence the impact, like a proof of claim;
otherwise the Court has no interest in the non-debtor parties' squabble" (citation
omitted)); In re Salem Mills, Inc., 148 B.R. 505, 509 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); In re
Spaulding & Co., 131 B.R. 84 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that action among nondebtor parties involving indemnity agreement against debtor is not per se "related to"
underlying bankruptcy case; "related to" proceeding must have a real or tangible or
conceivable impact upon allocation of property among creditors evidenced by actual
proof of claim, and not some probable or potential interference).

